In this paper, we quantify the efficiency of price-only contracts in supply chains with demand distributions by imposing prior knowledge only on the support, namely, those distributions with support [a, b] for 0 < a ≤ b < +∞. By characterizing the price of anarchy (PoA) under various push supply chain configurations, we enrich the application scope of the PoA concept in supply chain contracts along with complementary managerial insights. One of our major findings is that our quantitative analysis can identify scenarios where the price-only contract actually maintains its efficiency, namely, when the demand uncertainty, measured by the relative range b/a, is relatively low, entailing the price-only contract to be more attractive in this regard.
Quantifying the Efficiency of Price-Only Contracts in Push Supply Chains over Demand Distributions of Known Supports
Introduction
Price of anarchy (PoA), a quantifier measuring the inefficiency of a multi-agent system due to selfish behavior of its agents, has been an extremely popular concept in computer science and operations research communities in the last decade (Nisan et al. (2007) ). Perakis and Roels (2007) pioneered its application in supply chain contracts and obtained the PoA for price-only contract for several configurations of the underlying supply chain when the demand distributions possess the (weakly) increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) property. A nonnegative random variable X with cumulative distribution function (cdf) F (x) and probability density function (pdf) f (x) is of IGFR property if xf (x)/F (x) is nondecreasing for all x such thatF (x) > 0, whereF (x) = 1 − F (x). We will use F IGFR to denote the class of all distributions with IGFR property. One of the most important managerial insights observed from their analysis is that the worst PoA under F IGFR is at least 1.71 (a 71% loss of efficiency) even for the simple twostage chain, and consequently price-only contract may not be a viable practical contract with certain demand distributions due to this large loss of efficiency. Nevertheless, the price-only contract has been widely adopted in many real-life practices. This popularity has been constantly attributed to its low administrative cost (cf. Cachon (2003) ).
Preliminaries 2.1 The centralized setting
For any given supply chain system, we imagine a centralized system facing a standard newsvendor problem where a single decision maker operates the entire supply chain. Without loss of generality, we assume the uncertain demand X follows a continuous distribution with probability density function f , cumulative probability function F and complementary cumulative probability functionF = 1 − F (x) defined on support [a, b] (0 < a ≤ b). Let r be the unit inbound cost and w.l.o.g. p = 1 be the normalized out-bound cost. Therefore, the imaginary decision-maker seeks to decide an inventory level x to maximize the profit Π(x) of the entire supply chain: 
The decentralized setting
The game-theoretic settings to be considered can be described by the following simple scenario with two players. There is a manufacturer producing a product with cost r per unit whose goal is to set the price of the product to some value w so that he maximizes his profit.
There is also a retailer who buys the product from the manufacturer at price w per unit and sells it with price 1 per unit. The demand X for the product follows a probability distribution. Hence, the goal of the retailer is, given the price w of the product, to determine the inventory x that optimizes his expected profit, i.e., to determine x so that −wx+E[min x, X] is maximized. Now, given the decision of the retailer for x, the manufacturer's optimal price is a value for w so that her profit (w − r)x is maximized. When both the manufacturer and the retailer are profit maximizers, the total profit at equilibrium will be in general suboptimal. The PoA captures the profit loss due to the selfishness of the manufacturer and the retailer.
More complicated settings that generalize the one above will be considered in the sections to follow. They include those with more than two parties (Sec. 3) and with a tree-like structure (Sec. 4, and Sec. 5).
The formal definition of PoA
Before we formally define PoA, we note an essential difference between the classes F [a, b] and F IGFR , which poses some technical challenges in our analysis later. The price-only contract can be formulated as a multi-level mathematical program, where multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) may exist in the lower level problem for some parameter values, leading to ambiguity in the definition of the problem. To avoid this ambiguity, this work adopts the well-accepted optimistic approach in the multi-level programming literature (e.g., Dempe (2002) ) with the economic interpretation that the follower is willing to support the leader, namely the follower will select, among all solutions optimal to himself, one that is best for the leader. Note that this is not a concern for the two-stage price-only contract under F [a, b] and two-or three-stage problem under F IGFR .
Throughout the rest of this paper, let x c denote the optimal inventory level of the centralized system and x d any inventory level of the decentralized system at equilibrium. To capture the essence of the issues, we assume, where applicable, that F (x) is smooth enough to ensure differentiability almost everywhere. For convenience we denote ρ = b/a and
dropping off the subscript F whenever no confusion is caused. Let us formally define the price of anarchy (PoA) for a given price-only contract as follows:
.
Serial supply chain
The organization of this section is as follows: we first describe the problem in Sec. 
Problem description
Let us label the stages of the decentralized supply chain in an increasing order from downstream to upstream: 1, . . . , n. Each upstream stage i (i = n, . . . , 2) as a leader offers a wholesale price w i−1 to his next downstream stage i − 1 as a follower, who accepts his offer as long as his expected profit is non-negative. The price-only contract under this supply chain system can be formulated as an n-level optimization problem (refer to Fig. 1 ): the random customer demand X and chooses his order quantity x as inventory in such a way that his profit is to be maximized after selling the products to customers at a unit price of p = 1:
. Stage i with a given transferring price w i from his upstream stage, offers a transferring price w i−1 to his downstream stage i − 1 in such a way that will maximize his profit, anticipating the order quantity x (a ≤ x ≤ b) from the downstream stage: max wi−1:wi−1≥wi
Level n. Stage n with the unit production cost r, offers a whole price w n−1 to his downstream stage n−1 to maximize his profit, anticipating the order quantity x (a ≤ x ≤ b) from the downstream stage: max wn−1≥r
Note that we adopt the optimistic approach in the multi-level programming literature (e.g., Dempe (2002) ) to guarantee that this multi-level program is well-defined. Note also that the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium is evident as all the optimization problems across the n levels are feasible with compact domain and continuous objectives. But multiple local optima and hence multiple equilibria may exist.
PoA
Denote ln k ρ = (ln ρ) k , where ρ = b/a ≥ 1. The next result offers the exact PoA for this contract system along with graph illustration in Fig. 2 .
Theorem 1 The price of anarchy is given by
The bound is achieved by the following worst distribution: 
Uniform distribution U[a, b]
We use the two-stage supply chain under the uniform distribution U[a, b] to further illustrate the results obtained here. Moreover it also serves the purpose of showing the limitations of any worst-case analysis, namely, more accurate insights should be expected when more information about the demand distributions is available. Under U[a, b], we have x c = (1 − r)b + ra and
which implies that, for any x ∈ [a, b),
Therefore, we can obtain the PoA as follows:
A few observations from this characterization (see Figure 3 
Impact of the coefficient of variation (CV). Note that the CV of U[a, b) is given by
Therefore, ρ increases with CV, which implies that dependence on CV of the PoA for the uniform distribution is similar to that on ρ, i.e., with increase of CV, the PoA first increases and then decreases after CV goes beyond certain threshold.
Assembly supply chain
In such a system, the manufacturer produces a unit product at the cost of c 0 by assembling n components supplied by n upstream competitive suppliers with unit production cost c i for supplier i (i = 1, . . . , n), and sells the end product at unit price p = 1 (refer to 
Problem description
Each supplier i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) as a leader offers a unit wholesale price w i for his component to the manufacturer as the follower, who accepts the offer to produce for his inventory as long as his profit is nonnegative. The price-only contract under the system can be formulated as an bi-level optimization problem: with optimal order quantity:
Level 2. The suppliers choose their Nash equilibrium wholesale prices w 1 , . . . , w n to maximize their profits, anticipating the order quantity x from the manufacturer:
Possible non-existence of an equilibrium
Unfortunately, unlike the other systems we consider, in the push assembly system here, the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the sub-games involved and, more seriously, the existence of Stackelberg equilibria in the decentralized supply chain may not be guaranteed for general class F [a, b] of demand distributions, as indicated in Appendix B, where a whole sub-class of distributions allows only those equilibria at which the assembler has zero profit in the supply chain, entailing that the assembler cannot remain in business! Gerchak and Wang (2004) require that, at an equilibrium, every partner in the supply chain system has a positive profit to make, so that all partners can remain in business and the supply chain system is sustainable. While we technically allow such an equilibrium in the worst-case (as we have seen in the previous sections), it is not clear at all whether an equilibrium will exist for any given distribution in class F [a, b]. Therefore, in this section we are interested only in those distributions that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium.
PoA
The following result offers the exact PoA for the push assembly system along with the graph illustration in Fig. 5 . The worst distribution is achieved bȳ
Uniform distribution U[a, b]
Analogously to the analysis in Sec. 3.3, under U[a, b] we obtain the PoA as follows: 
Competitive distribution system
In such a system, the manufacturer produces certain product at a unit cost of r, and n identical retailers, each with unit selling price p = 1, compete for the same aggregate demand X, which is allocated to the retailers according to some rule as specified in Lippman and McCardle (1997) or Cachon (2003) (refer to Fig. 6 ).
We distinguish between the herd-behaved customers and the proportionally-split customers respectively in Sec. 5.1 and 5.2.
Herd behavior of customers

Problem description
The manufacturer as the leader offers wholesale prices w i (i = 1, . . . , n) to retailers as followers, who accept the offers for their inventories as long as their individual profits are nonnegative. Assume that aggregate demand X is allocated to the retailers according to the herd behavior of the customers (Lippman and McCardle, 1997), namely, these customers, randomly choosing an order π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) among retailers with equal probability among all permutations, visit the retailer one at a time until the total demand is met. The priceonly contract under this supply chain systems can be formulated as a bi-level optimization problem: 
This subgame has a unique Nash equilibrium and it is symmetric (Lippman and McCardle, 1997). Due to symmetry because of the equi-probability of all permutations, the manufacturer offers the same wholesale price w to all retailers, each of whom orders the same quantity y := x i (i = 1, . . . , n) at any Nash equilibrium. Therefore, each retailer faces the same optimization problem: 
PoA
Now we establish bounds on the PoA along with the graph illustration in Fig. 7 .
Theorem 3 The price of anarchy for the class F [a, b] has the following upper and lower bounds:
(1 + ln ρ)/(1 + ln n) ≤ PoA ≤ 1 + ln ρ. Analogously to the analysis in Sec. 3.3, under U[a, b] we obtain the PoA as follows:
Note that when a = 0 and hence ρ → ∞, the second case above leads to PoA = (n + 1) 2 /(n(n + 2)) under U[0, b). We can derive similar insights as those in Sec. 3.3.
Splitting customers
Problem description
Assume that the aggregate demand X is allocated to the retailers in proportion to their inventory levels and there is no reallocation of the unmet demand (Cachon, 2003) . The manufacturer as the leader offers wholesale price w to all retailers as followers, who accept the offer as long as his profit is nonnegative. The price-only contract in this supply chain systems can be formulated as a bi-level optimization problem (refer to Fig. 6 ):
, facing the random demand proportionally allocated to him, decides his order quantity x i at wholesale price w to maximize his profit:
where x = n k=1 x k . This subgame has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric (Cachon, 2003) .
Level 2. The manufacturer chooses the wholesale price w to maximize his profit, anticipating retailers' order quantity x 1 , . . . , x n :
. . , n.
PoA
The following result offers the exact PoA for the system along with the graph illustration in Fig. 8 .
Theorem 4
The price of anarchy is given by
The worst distribution is achieved bȳ
Uniform distribution
The result is exactly the same as that in Sec. 5.1.3.
Concluding remarks
We have extended the application of the PoA analysis in supply chain management. Our results have revealed some new performance behavior of the price-only contract in various supply chain systems and hence deepened our understanding of it. The following observations follow readily from our analysis:
1. The bounds derived in this paper are independent of costs, prices and the boundaries a and b of the demand distribution support. In particular, (a) The bounds in the present work do not depend on upstream supply costs. This property is an attractive feature in environments of fluctuating commodity prices. (c) Moreover, in the assembly setting where multiple equilibria can exist in the absence of the IGFR property, our PoA bounds serve the purpose to necessitate the need of coordinating contracts in settings where ambiguity surrounds the demand distribution, cost/price parameters, and/or the particular equilibrium reached.
2. One of the major contributions of this work is the identification of the relative range ρ = b/a, a measure of uncertainty, as a pivotal parameter in that the PoA obtained usually improves with reduced fluctuation ratio, although the exact analytical formula for PoA is highly nontrivial. Intuitively, on the one hand, when there is demand certainty, namely ρ = 1, it should be clear that both the decentralized and centralized solution will be to order the exact demand, leading to perfect coordination with PoA = 1. On the other hand, when there is uncertainty in the demand, namely, ρ > 1, the decentralized solution can be forced to order a while the centralized solution is to order b in the worst case.
3. Our analysis under F [a, b] in this work shows that the price-only contract actually maintains its efficiency when the demand uncertainty, measured by ratio ρ = b/a, is relatively low, entailing the price-only contract to be more attractive in this regard than those administratively more expensive contracts as those considered, e.g., by This insight of efficiency improvement with decrease of ρ is empirically and qualitatively intuitive, given that the main source of double marginalization is demand uncertainty (Lariviere and Porteus (2001)). However, to the best of our knowledge, our work here is the first one to theoretically quantify this effect, achieved by the introduction of an uncertainty measure, ρ.
4. Our analysis also shows that worst-case PoAs under F [a, b] and F IGFR are complementary in the following sense: the former is in general independent of the profit margin 1 − r, while the latter is in general increasing in the profit margin.
Note that the aforementioned insights are obtained through worst-case analysis and for a given demand distribution other than the worse-case distribution. The PoA may not perform as described above (see Sec. 3.3, Sec. 4.4, Sec. 5.1.3, and Sec. 5.2.3 for the exact PoA under the uniform distribution, for which the PoA behaves differently from the worst-case situation). Therefore, one should exercise caution and care when applying the observations based on worst-case analysis to a given demand distribution other than the worst-case distributions.
An apparent open problem is to find a tight bound for the distribution system with herd behavior (Theorem 3). Moreover, due to the practical importance of the price-only contract, an investigation of other demand classes would be important for identifying the situations where the price-only contract is relatively efficient.
A.1 Proof for Theorem 1
We need two lemmas first. Define the following functions iteratively:
Here the prime operator ′ is the standard derivative in calculus.
Lemma 1 If the decentralized equilibrium inventory level x d is an interior solution of the n-level optimization problem with w i being the corresponding equilibrium transfer price at stage i (i = 1, . . . , n − 1), then
implying that
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove equations (1) by induction. For i = 1, the optimization problem at stage 1 is:
So, if the optimal solution x is interior, then it satisfies the first-order condition w 1 =F (x) = m 1 (x). Assume that the equation in (1) is correct for i = ℓ − 1 (ℓ ≥ 2), namely, the optimal interior solution x of the optimization problem at stage ℓ − 1 satisfies w ℓ−1 = m ℓ−1 (x).
Consider the optimization problem at stage ℓ:
If optimal w ℓ−1 results in optimal interior x, then according to the induction hypothesis, the above optimization problem is equivalent to:
Therefore, the optimal solution x satisfies the first-order condition:
which completes our induction. Denote the following quantities:
Then from (2) in Lemma 1, we have
Lemma 2 Assume that the decentralized equilibrium inventory level x d is an interior solution to the n-level optimization problem. Then, for any x ≥ x d , we have
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove the lemma by induction on i. For i = 1, the optimization problem at stage n is max
Since optimal w n−1 (i.e., w * n−1 ) results in an interior x d , according to equations (1), the above problem is equivalent to
or equivalently
Therefore,
which implies the basis step in the induction. Assume that the desired result is correct for i = ℓ − 1, that is, we have the inductive hypothesis,
Note that the LHS of the above inequality is equal to
which, by integration, implies
This completes the inductive step.
Taking i = n − 1 and x = x c in Lemma 2, we obtain
where
Proof of Theorem 1
We consider three cases depending on whether the decentralized solution x d of the n-level optimization problem is achieved at the upper support, or an interior point, or the lower support. If
Recall that any optimal solution x for the optimization problem at stage 1 satisfies the first order condition:
Consider the optimization problem at stage 2:
That x d = a being the equilibrium solution for the entire system implies that there exists aw 2 ∈ [r, 1] such that the optimal objective value at stage 2 is (1 −w 2 )a ≤ (1 − r)a. Fix w 2 = r in the above optimization problem at stage 2. Then the optimal value should be no more than (1 − r)a, implying that
which in turn implies that
making inequality (4) valid also for x d = a. Therefore, we assume a ≤ x d < b with satisfaction of inequality (4), from which and the following inequality directly implied by the monotonicity of functionF ,
we obtain
Now we show the bound is tight. Under the worst distribution, we have that
which implies that x c = b as the objective of the centralized system
is an increasing function. On the other hand, x d can be any value within [a, b) because the objective at stage n in the decentralized system:
is a constant throughout. So for this worst distribution:
A.2 Proof for Theorem 2
Lemma 3 Let r = n i=0 c i . Then
Proof of Lemma 3. At Nash Equilibrium, the utility Π i (w 1 , . . . , w n ) of each supplier i (i = 1, . . . , n) is maximized with respect to w i . Assume that the Nash Equilibrium is (w * 1 , . . . , w * n ) with the corresponding order quantity x d . Hence, for any x ∈ [a, b], we have
Summation for i = 1, . . . , n leads to
which, after integration, gives
Proof of Theorem 2
From (5) and Lemma 3, we obtain
Under the worst distribution, we have that
implying that x c = b, because the objective of the centralized system
is an increasing function.
It can be further shown that w 
is a constant, implying that x d = a is an Nash equilibrium. So for this worst distribution:
A.3 Proof for Theorem 3
We first prove the following two lemmas.
Hence,
The following parameterized distribution is a minimizing distribution with ǫ → 0:
Proof of Lemma 4. The integration concerned is equal to
which approaches a+(x−a)φ as ǫ → 0. The equation for PoA above follows from Definition 1.
This lemma basically says that restricting on the minimizing distributions above will not preclude any distribution that maximizes the PoA containing parameters x d , x c and φ.
Lemma 5 For any given δ > 0, let F (·) = F ǫ (·) be a worst distribution as given in Lemma 4 for some ǫ > 0 sufficiently small. Denote φ =F (x d ) and the manufacturer's utility function
(kQ/n) − r Q. according to the definition of F (·). Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume a ℓ−1 < x d ≤ a ℓ for some ℓ with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n − 1, where a i = n n − i a, i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1.
where H n = n k=1 1/k denotes the nth harmonic number. For any ℓ = 1, . . . , n − 1, the above is maximized uniquely at a ℓ to a(1 − r)(1 + H n − H n−ℓ ) ≤ (1 − r)aH n , the constant that Π 1 (x) is always equal to while ℓ = n. Therefore, if b > na, we can have x d = na, which together with (8) Any Nash equilibrium satisfies the first-order condition:
(y)dy x 2 = 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Due to symmetry: x = nx i (i = 1, . . . , n), the above is reduced to a simple equation:
(y)dy Integrating on both sides from a to t and substituting γ(x d ) back leads to the desired result.
